Why It Is Time for the West to Crush Putin’s War Economy
Time · LC · trust 29/100
The death of Senator Lindsey Graham is a devastating blow to his family, his constituents, his colleagues in government, but also a profound setback for the resolution of global conflicts involving Ukraine and Russia, Israel and Iran. Graham’s unflinching stand on military support of Ukraine and Israel was a vital intervention in the corridors of American power. Graham introduced the Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025, to tighten sanctions against Russia, with strong bipartisan support and the apparent blessing of President Donald Trump.
To be sure, while the United States holds a major lever here, the loyal support Ukraine has received from the European Union has helped strengthen Ukrainian morale and muscle on the battlefield. Yet still, much more could be done by the bloc.
The Graham sanctions legislation under consideration would impose 500% secondary tariffs, property-blocking sanctions on any financial institution owned by Russia or by individuals within the Russian government, and further banking sanctions. This Sanctioning Russia Act , perhaps soon to be renamed the Lindsey Graham Act in his memory, would deal a serious blow that could, at last, end Vladimir Putin’s bloody and imperialistic invasion of Ukraine.
Last week in Ankara, NATO leaders gathered for the ritual family photo and once again pledged unwavering support for Ukraine. It was a convergence of principled respect for the survival of a sovereign, peaceful neighboring nation and of mutual self-interest in the face of Putin’s imperial agenda.
The final communiqué was resolute, with defense budgets of NATO members finally rising and continued, generous humanitarian support for Ukraine celebrated with warm, shared applause. Yet despite all of this critical support, the West has had the power to end this war long ago—and at relatively modest cost—had it possessed the consistency to match its spirit with its actions.
Beyond superior military power and a unified diplomatic voice, the West holds overwhelming economic power. The Ankara gathering promoted a comforting fiction of joint action, an exercise in self-congratulation that obscured an uncomfortable truth: the private sector has fought this war with greater consistency and greater courage than many of the governments now praising one another.
We write neither as passive bystanders nor as combatants, but as active parties nonetheless. Within days of Russia’s invasion, our Yale team mobilized nearly 200 volunteer researchers working around the clock—on the ground in Russia and neighboring countries, and deep in customs records, shipping manifests, and corporate filings—to track every major multinational operating in Russia and publicly grade each one from A to F.
That transparency campaign helped catalyze the historic withdrawal of more than 1,200 companies from Russia, the largest voluntary corporate exodus ever recorded. Those firms represented roughly 40% of Russia’s prewar GDP. Their departure erased three decades of foreign investment in months and went far beyond anything sanctions law required. That distinction matters more than many commentators appreciate. Sanctions and corporate withdrawal are complementary but fundamentally different instruments.
Economic sanctions are coercive tools by which governments compel compliance under threat of legal penalty. Voluntary corporate exits, by contrast, carry moral weight and genuine market power. When boards and CEOs independently concluded that Putin’s Russia had become both legally indefensible and commercially uninvestable, it was a major blow to Putin’s propaganda, his global standing, and his economic position.
These two approaches—government actions and private actions—are designed to function as a one-two punch, much as they did against apartheid South Africa. Sanctions prevent principled firms from being undercut by opportunistic competitors. Corporate withdrawal deprives the Kremlin of what legislation alone cannot reach: technology, capital and legitimacy. For four years, the corporate punch has landed. It is the government punch that has repeatedly been pulled, with western governments repeatedly relaxing sanctions on Russia precisely when they should be tightening them.
Consider the loosening of enforcement of energy sanctions on Russia. In March, April, and May, the Treasury Department repeatedly issued or extended general licenses allowing Russian crude already at sea to be sold and unloaded. Officials defended the waivers as measures to stabilize energy markets. The timing could hardly have been worse: the pressure had been on the verge of fracturing Putin’s economic hold. By Dec. 2025, Urals crude had fallen below $40 per barrel.
Oil and gas revenues had declined to their smallest share of Russia’s budget in two decades. The International Monetary Fund projected growth of just 0.8 percent. Then came the waivers. Russian crude exports climbed from 4.9 million barrels per day in February to six million by May, and the failure to enforce Russian energy sanctions has since allowed Putin to continue reaping windfall profits from elevated oil prices.
If Washington has been inconsistent, much of Europe has been outright contradictory. Consider France. Despite public protests against Putin, Total Energies booked $14.8 billion in write-downs while quietly retaining its crown jewels: a 19.4% stake in Novatek, Russia’s largest Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) producer, and a 20% interest in the Yamal LNG project, whose cargoes continue to arrive in French ports under long-term contracts.
France became Europe’s largest importer of Russian LNG by 2024, helping Russia build export facilities it did not previously have, even as President Emmanuel Macron urged greater strategic resolve in standing up to Russia. Le Monde reported that condensate from a Total Energies joint venture had been refined into jet fuel powering Russian aircraft attacking Ukrainian cities. The company denied wrongdoing, sold one affected…
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