From patron to partner: Syria’s new relationship with Russia
Christian Science Monitor · C · trust 41/100
| Yuri Kochetkov/Sputnik/AP/File Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa shake hands as they pose for photos before a meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow, Jan. 28, 2026. Loading...
Throughout 14 years of Syria’s civil war, Russia made its presence felt in a myriad of ways. It protected then-President Bashar al-Assad by helping to crush his opponents militarily. Jets roared from Hmeimim, the main Russian air base near Latakia. Warships crowded Tartus, Moscow’s naval hub on the Mediterranean. And at the United Nations, Russia repeatedly used its veto to shield the Assad regime in Damascus.
Much of that effort now looks spent, with Mr. Assad ousted from power and living in exile in Russia since December 2024. Syria’s new government is using new leverage to revamp the relationship, stripping back privileges Moscow once enjoyed and strengthening ties with a range of foreign powers, including the United States, Turkey, Arab Gulf states, and Europe.
In the post-Assad era, Russia’s biggest success so far has been simply to remain.
During Syria’s long civil war, Russia propped up the Assad regime with military and diplomatic support. Now, the new government in Damascus is recalibrating the power dynamic with Moscow.
“The actual blow to Russia’s position in Syria came with Assad’s fall,” says Nanar Hawach of the International Crisis Group. “Russia has gone from patron to one partner among several.”
Syria’s emerging relationship with Russia is narrower and more transactional. Damascus wants to retain Russian military expertise, supplies, and diplomatic support – minus the Assad-era dependence. Moscow is willing to accept fewer privileges and greater Syrian sovereignty in exchange for continued access to its old military bases. They will provide a strategic foothold in the eastern Mediterranean and support Russian operations into Africa.
That logic culminated in an August memorandum of understanding signed by Syria and Russia. Damascus regained control over civilian facilities at Hmeimim airport and Tartus port, while Russia preserved a military presence through joint training with Syrian forces. Dr. Hawach says the deal shows “how quickly strategic interests can overtake wartime labels.”
Mahmoud Hassano/Reuters A drone view shows a vessel at Berth No. 4, which was handed over by Russian forces to the Syrian government, at the port of Tartus, Syria, Aug. 12, 2026. The most striking part of the memorandum is its provision for joint security training. Ahmed al-Sharaa, now Syria’s interim president, is a former commander of an Al Qaeda-affiliated rebel group called the Nusra Front.
“Moscow once bombed forces led by al-Sharaa and called them terrorists. Today, it is discussing joint army training,” Dr. Hawach says. “For Russia, that is pragmatic statecraft. For Syrians who fought Assad or lost relatives in Russian airstrikes, it is much harder to swallow, which makes it politically important for Damascus to show that Russia is now operating on Syrian terms.”
From the outset, Syria’s new leaders have been explicit that engagement with Moscow does not equal a return to the old relationship. “We are building pragmatic relations with Russia,” Asaad al-Shaibani, Syria’s foreign minister, told an audience at the Chatham House think tank in London late last year.
“We do not want [Russia] to dominate Syria as it did in the past, nor do we seek to antagonize it,” he said.
Russia is still a vital partner for Syria. Much of the country’s military hardware is Russian-made, leaving Damascus dependent on Moscow for equipment, spare parts, and expertise. Russia is also a major supplier of wheat and crude oil, two commodities that are critical as Syria’s new leadership looks to rebuild the country’s battered economy.
More broadly, analysts say maintaining a restructured relationship with Russia also gives Syria another diplomatic option at minimal cost.
“You don’t want to put all your eggs in one basket,” says Amr al-Azm, professor of Middle East history and anthropology at Shawnee State University. Washington is not pressing Damascus to expel Russian forces, he says, so there is little reason for the government in Syria to humiliate Moscow or turn it into an enemy.
It is unclear how far Damascus is willing to go in allowing the Russian military to maintain a footprint in the country. “The Syrians are OK with the Russians staying as long as it’s low key,” Dr. al-Azm says. “No issues, no problems, and then we’ll figure out what happens later on.”
Hussein Malla/AP/File Syrians celebrate at the first Friday prayers since Bashar al-Assad's ouster, at the central square in Damascus, Syria, Dec. 13, 2024. That calculation is made easier by the fact that Moscow does not currently pose a direct threat to the new leadership in Syria. Russia may be providing safe haven to Assad and members of his former regime, but it is not allowing them to organize against Damascus from Russian soil.
“If they keep them on a tight leash and don’t let them do any kind of activity from their territory against the current administration,” Dr. al-Azm adds, “I take that as a win.”
A court in Syria recently sentenced Mr. Assad to death in absentia for torture, murder, and crimes against humanity. Experts, however, agree that the odds Russia would hand over the Syrian strongman for prosecution are slim.
“Russia will never extradite him,” says Vladimir Sotnikov, an independent foreign policy expert based in Moscow. “He will stay here with his family and assets. Russia can not permit such a precedent, as there are lots of other countries that might come up with similar claims.”
Mr. al-Sharaa’s diplomatic efforts have focused on diversifying Syria’s partnerships, while maintaining a degree of symmetry when it comes to dealing with major world powers. Since taking over as interim leader, he has traveled twice to Russia and twice to the U.S., where he met with President Donald Trump in the Oval…
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